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Consultations with the Congress 
on Conte-Long and Symingto~ Amendments 
?uggested Talking Points 
Ao Introduction 
1. We wish to discuss a matter of considerable 
urgency--the implementation of the Conte-Long and 
Symin~ton Amendments to the FAA and IDB Act and the 
policy issues confronting us as a result of these new 
provisions. 
2o The Amendments reflect an understandable concern 
of the Congress over the trend of arms spending by LDCs--
and over the effect of this trend on the prospects for 
peace, development and representative popular government 
in the developing worldo 
3. The objective of the Executive Branch in this 
matter i~ the same as that of the Congress. In years 
past we have made considerable efforts to dissuade friendly 
countries from unnecessary military spending--particularly 
those receiving our aid. 
·-we. recognize that the Congress , 
in passing these Amendments, has given the Executive Branch 
a·new mandate 1 to look for new initiatives and to make even 
greater use of United States leverage and influence in 
pressing for restraint in military spending by LDCs. 
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S. We would like to discuss today several issues 
pertaining to these Amendments: 
a. Our general approach; . ' 
-· 
b. ·The steps we have already~ken and plan 
· to take to implement them; 
Co Some of the problems and policy dilemmas 
that we foresee in respect to particular country 
situations; 
do Some of the general guidelines and work 
rules under which we plan to keep aid recipient countries 
under continuing reviewo 
Bo Some General Considerations 
lo We plan to undertake a serious effort to 
implement the Amendmentso The broad policy objective, 
as we see it, i~ to work towards increased awareness 
and consciousness of this problem internationally (both 
among DCs and LDCs) and to help create a climate which 
would strengthen the position of the advocates of 
restraint in LDC governments. 
Zo We would, however, be misleading the Congress 
if we would promise dramatic results quickly. We have 
only limited in~luence with foreign governments in an 
area which is at the heart of national sovereigntyo 
Furthermore, many governments have only limited room 
of maneuver on matters of defense policy because of 
public concern over national security and the political 
standing and influence of the military leaders. If we 
press too hard, we will lose our ability to influence 
the policies of these governments. 
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3. Application of these provisions, therefore, 
will encounter many difficultieso We would like to 
stay in close touch with interested members of the 
Congress. We consider this only the first of a series 
of discussions. 
C. Principles of Implementation 
Our implementation of these Amendments will be-
based on four principles: 
lo We will do our best to prevent the emergence 
of problem caseso We will convey our concern over 
~ military spending plans of LDCs well in advance of 
the time when the Amendments require us to invoke 
pena 1 ties., 
2. We will make LDC governments keenly aware of 
these Amendments, our determination to implement them, 
and the concern of the United States Congress and public 
over the trend of arms spending in the developing world. 
In this manner, we hope that the statute will serve to 
deter and discourage excessive or unnecessary military 
spending. 
3o While Congress was clear on the penalties to be 
applied, we assune that punis ~1rr.en t was not the prin 1ary 
pu~pose. Therefore our first effort will .. oe to obtain 
changes in resource allocation or modification of 
,, 
unwise equipn,en t purchases. 
4. We will formally and publicly invoke the penalty 
provisions only after we have exhausted all possible 
avenues to obtain assurances of a remedy. There are, 
of course, many ways in which we can begin to exercise 
pressure well before the formal invocation of the 
penalties required by the statute--such as slowing 
down or delaying our further aid commitments . 
. 
-GONFIBENTIAI:; 
-@NFIDENTIAl. 
-4-
D. Steps Taken or in Prospect 
1. We have already reviewed several problem cases 
at a high level within the Administration and others 
will follow. Certain actions--described below--have 
been taken. The process includes: 
a. Determination by the AID Administrator as 
part of the review and approval process for economic 
assistance programs, whether the Conte-Long or Symington 
Amendments are applicable. 
b. A similar determination by the Deputy 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs on the applicability 
of the Conte-Long Amendment to military assistance and 
sales programs. 
c. Cases where one of the Amendments are applicable 
will be further reviewed by the Under Secretary, using 
the IRG/SIG mechanism for inter-agency review and consul-
tation. 
2. We have formed two inter-agency committees to 
advise the AID Administrator, the Deputy Under Secretary 
for Political Affairs, and the Under Secretary on possible 
problem cases. These committees will keep defense expen-
ditures and procurement policies of aid recipients under 
continuing review, assess country situations and prepare 
eligible for United States assistance or cash sales 
programs under the Amendments. 
3. United States economic assistance will be 
committed only if we feel reasonably assured--or 
have fonnal assurances, where appropriate--that the 
country concerned will not make expenditures or purchase 
commitments in violation of the Amendments during the 
current fiscal year. 
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4o We have instructed diplomatic missions around 
the world to review with host governments the concern 
of the United States Congress and public about arms 
spending by LDCs, to review the new provisions, and to 
request data concerning their host government's defense 
budgets and procurement planso These data will be cross-
checked against information from intelligence sources 
to avoid full dependence upon data officially furnished 
by LDC governments. 
5. We will also continue the various measures 
through which we have tried to discourage excessive 
defense spending by LDCs in the past. For example, 
control over United States equipment and United States 
components in third country equipment, our role in in-
fluencing budgetary policies of countries dependent 
upon United States economic and military aid, consul-
tations with friendly governments relying on United 
States military assistance and/or bilateral security 
arrangements, encouragement to regional economic and 
security arrangements bet\-,1 een neighboring countries--
all these have in the past and will continue to be used 
by us to promote our objectiveo 
60 We are also planning steps to work for greater 
international concern as to this issue in appropriate 
multilateral bodies or institutions (eog. IBRD, DAC ad 
hoc multilateral groups, etco). 
Pressures for Modernization E. Problems in Latin America: 
--
1
0 
General Comments: In Latin America most of 
our probl~s-~;ifl -aris;-under the Conte-Long rather 
than the Symington Amendments (but note Peru). Defense 
spending is, as a rule, fairly modest in relative and 
absolute terms--as it should be. Furthermore, we have 
been fairly succcss[ul over the years in slowing do\vn 
the introduction of more advanced weapons systems. 
For example, Latin America today is the only continent 
·oithout Hach 1 fighter nirc;raft. 
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This period of highly effective restraint is 
gradually coming to an end as aircraft and other 
weapons systems wear out and obsolescence increases. 
Latin American military leaders and governments do 
not see that they should replace obsolescent air-
craft with other aircraft of 1950 vintage. 
This does not mean, however, that we are about 
to see an arms race in Latin America for the most 
advanced weapons syste~ now in use in the developing 
world. If we pursue our policy of restraint with 
skill and tact, there is still an excellent chance 
. that La tin American inventories and defense budgets 
will remain very reasonable compared to most other 
developing regions of the world. 
How quickly various countries in Latin America 
will move towards acquisition of more advanced weapons 
will vary from country to country, and--to some extent--
our influence and diplomatic skillo 
2o The Proplem of Peru: We have been concerned 
both over the trend of military spending and the 
procurement of particular weaponso For this reason, 
we have withheld a $40 million balance of payments 
loan; asked informally for deferral of an IDB Board 
decision on several loans to Peru; and plan to send 
a high level emissary to Lima to discuss Peru 1 s 
military spending plans and arrive at appropriate 
allowances. 
The facts are: 
Conte··Lono-: Peru has purchased (on credit) 
a squadron-of Fren~h Mirages at a reported cost of 
$26 million. These purchases were made before the 
enactment of the Amendments but as a matter of policy 
we nevertheless decided to withhold the balance of 
payments loano 
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Symington: Peru ' s defense expenditures 
in relation to total government spending had been 
on a declining trend between 1960 and 1966 . But 
from 1966 to 1967 defense spending rose from 16 
to 19 percent of total government expenditures . 
Although development expenditures held their own , 
the fact is that this increase coincided with a 
deteriorating balance of payments , a devaluation 
and a rising budget deficito Accordingly , we felt 
there was a reasonable question about the applicability 
of the Symington Amendment . 
The case of Peru presents us with a 
serious dilemmao 
President Belaunde does not have the 
political strength simply to ignore the demands of the 
milita ryo The Peruvian Congress , particularly the 
opposition , ha s voted ovenvhelrningly for the 
authorizing legislation enabling the military to 
buy new equipment. The opposition , which is strongly 
nationalist uses this issue to increase its 
political acceptability to the military in hope 
of eventually succeeding Belaunde to the Presidencyo 
Even assuming that ·we can persuade 
Be laund e to adopt a fairly hard line towards the 
military, we should recognize that such a posture 
entails conside rable riskso The Peruvian military 
as recently as December seriously considered a 
military coup. The poor state of Peru ' s economy 
was the principal deterrento But a refusal of 
Belaunde to sanction the re-equipment program 
could shift the balance within the military elite . 
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Even if we were to withdraw our offer, 
we would not prevent acquisition of more advanced 
aircraft by Brazil. Costa e Silva would be com-
pelled to take up the French offero (The Brazilian 
President has apparently deferred a public anno~nce­
ment of his decision to purchase F-5s in order to 
permit a calming of public opiniono) The Mirages 
are a Mach 2 aircraft and considerably more expensive 
and technically complex than the F-5. A decision 
by Brazil in favor of Mirages would virtually 
assure that other countries in Latin America--
Argentina and Chile--would follow suit. 
There is a reasonable chance that Argentina 
and Chile will not press for F-5 aircraft at this 
time if Costa e Silva merely announces his decision 
to acquire F-5so In Argentina, President Ongania 
has sought to postpone the purchase of all but the 
most urgent items of military re-equipment on 
grounds tha t primary emphasis must be given to 
the stabilization and modernization of the economy. 
Similarly, Chile has not so far shown any interest 
in early negotiations and probably does not intend 
to undertake purchases before 1970 at the earliest. 
But withdrawal of the United States commitment to 
license such aircraft for comme rcial export would 
certainly trigger efforts by both countries to look 
for alternative sources. 
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F. The Mediterranean Area: The Issue of Defense 
Requirements 
1. General Comments: There are several 
countries in this area which in the past have :-. 
relied upon United States military aid: 
Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Jordan. In simplest 
terms, the issue is whether to continue our 
supplier relationship or let the Soviet Union 
into the position of principal supplier. 
We would like to discuss two specific and 
.urgent cases vhich illustrate our policy dilemma. 
2. ~_o: Morocco has asked us for F-5 
aircraft as part of a $14 million credit sale. 
This credit sale program was offered by the 
President to King Hassan in Washington last year 
provided it be used only for defensive purposes 
and not detract from Morocco's economic develop-
ment efforts. The proposed purchase follows upon 
an earlier credit sale of 12 F-5 aircraft, the 
last of which were delivered late last year. 
It is difficult to argue that these purchases 
are unreasonable in terms of legitimate Moroccan 
requirements of self-defense. Morocco's desire to 
strengthen its armed forces is a response to 
Algeria's massive arms build up, for which the 
Soviet Union has made available more than $200 
million in equipment over the past five yearso 
Algeria's arms inventory now includes some 160 
jet fighter and bomber aircraft and several hundred 
tanks and armored vehicles. Against this, Morocco 
at present has an air force consisting essentially 
of one F-5 squadron and some 31 lightly armed trainer 
aircraft
0 
While Morocco is trying to develop some 
deterrent capability there is no attempt to match 
the Algerian build up. 
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Withdrawal of the:_offer would compel 
Morocco to turn to the Soviets and other Eastern 
European supplierso France has suspended both 
economic and military materiel assistance since 
the Ben Barka affair in 19650 The Soviets have 
held open an offer of 40 MIG 2ls, guaranteed 
logistical support, and 20 AN-12 cargo aircraft. 
Morocco's willingness to turn to the East is sub-
stantiated by a recent contract with Czechoslovakia 
and past agreements with the Soviet Uniono It is 
now purchasing T-54 tanks from Czechoslovakia 
because of its inability to obtain armor in the 
West. In 1961 it acquired a squadron of MIG 17s 
(plus a 30-man Soviet technical assistance team). 
Soviet aircraft are now in storage, and the last 
members of the Soviet Union team returned home in 
1965. 
Thus, in reaching a dee is ion, \-.,1e must balance 
our desire to avoid contributing to an arms race in 
the Maghreb and the consequences of our refusal to 
supply Moroccan requirements. 
The limited amount of equipment we have been 
asked to provide would not contribute to an arms 
spiral. But, a major intrusion by the Soviets 
would be a major setback for our position in the 
Mediterrancano 
3. Jordan: Jordan presents us with an especially 
difficultproblcmo King Hussein has been a voice of 
moderation in the Arab worldo The hope for an Arab-
Israe1 settlement rests in considerable measure on 
his cooperation. But even without a settlement, his 
regime clearly is preferable to the type of radical 
ultra-nationalist and possibly unstable regime that 
would likely emerge upon his departureo 
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In years past, Hussein has been heavily dependent 
upon the United States for his military supplies. 
Jordan is the only country in the area which has 
not received any deliveries from us since the June 
hostilities. But survival of the Hashemite re·gime, 
which is dependent upon the support of the arms, 
requires that Hussein arrange for resupply of the 
equipment lost in the June hostilitieso The Soviets 
have offered to send a military supply mission to 
Amman. We have solid evidence that Hussein would 
accept the Soviet of fer if he is unable to meet his 
requirements in the West. These include supersonic 
· aircraft and medium to heavy tanks. 
In favor of arms supply by the United States it 
can be argued: 
a. The preservation of a moderate regime 
in Jordan, independent of Soviet influence, is 
essential to the stability of the area. 
b. Even if we meet Jordanian requests 
in full, Israel will maintain a clear military 
superiority over the combined Arab military forces. 
Jordan could not hope to fend off, for at most a 
few days, an Israeli offensive. 
c. Jordan's economy is unable to support 
a defense establishment of the present size. 
Temporarily Jordan is provided ·with adequate 
operating funds by the Arab oil countries ~hich 
will enable it to mal'e the do\vn payments required 
for new military equipmcnto But long range, if 
and when this financial support ceases, Jordan 
will require continued economic support from the 
West. If economic aid were permanently cut off, 
we risk a radical re-orientation of Hussein's foreign 
policyo 
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Go The Indian Sub-Continent : 
Economic Development 
Defense Budgets and 
The issue here i s one of how to persuade these 
governments to exercise maximum restraint in their 
defense budgets, consistent with their legitimate 
security requirements . The basic problem is the 
difference in view of what are legitimate defense 
requirements of the other country . India believes 
it must be strong enough to hold off concerted 
attacks by Communist China and Pakistan . Pakistan , 
on the other hand , discounts a Chinese military 
threat and evaluates India ' s military build-up 
exclusively in terms of the threat to itself . 
The United States , of course , is no longer a 
significant supplier of military equipment to 
either countryo After the hostilities in 1965 , 
we terminated. our Military Assistance Advisory 
Group in Pakistan and our Military Supply Mission 
in Indiao India and Pakistan are an issue under 
the Amendments because of purchases of equipment 
from third countries an~ the question of whether 
defense spending is excessive in terms of these 
countries ' legitimate military requirementso 
The facts as we know them are : 
Conte-Long_ Amendment: India is now receiving 
delivery of Soviet SU-7 fighter bomber , MIG 21 high-
level fighter aircraft, and T-55 medium tanks • . It 
also has contracts for three submarines from Italy . 
Pakistan has purchased 24 Mirage aircraft and a 
number of submarines from France and Italy . In all 
cases, the ·two governments appear to have obtained 
favorable credit terms so that the purchases do not 
constitute a serious foreign exchange drain over t he 
short term. Technically , the Conte-Long Amendment 
does not apply because all contracts pre-date the 
statute, some going back to 19660 
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-CONFIDENTIAL-
- 14 -
?ymington Amendment: Here the situation seems 
considerably more favorableo India ' s defense spending 
has leveled off in rupee figures in the last two 
years but in real terms has declined because of 
devaluation and inflationo Pakistan sharply in-
creased its defense spending after the 1965 hostilities 
but since then defense spending has been declining 
both absolutely and in terms of the total budgeto 
In both countries, defense expenditures account for 
roughly one fifth of the central government ' s total 
budget o 
Ever since the 1965 hostilities we have consistently 
· applied moral suasion and diplomatic efforts toward the 
objective of persuading each government to restrain its 
arms spending. There are no absolute, clear-cut 
quantitative tests we can apply to measure the degree 
to which our efforts have been effectiveo But the 
fact of the matter is that in neither country has there 
been an increase in defense spending levels while in 
Paki s t a n the re has been a significant decline. We 
believ our efforts have contributed to and strengthened 
existing forces in each country operating for restraint 
in defense spending o We believe we are on the right 
track and intend to continue our efforts. 
H. Conclusion 
This then is how we review problem cases in light 
of the Amendmentso Over all, we believe that the approach 
we have sketched out is a reasonable one and in con-
formance with the intent of lhe Congresso But pursuit 
of the policy objective will clearly be a very difficult 
road. We need the patience of the Congress and its 
understanding to the limits of what we can hope to 
achieve. We \Jould appreciate your reaction to this 
approach and how to deal with some of these policy 
dilemmas which ·we have outlinedo 
